OpenSSL Security Advisory [22nd May 2025] ========================================= The x509 application adds trusted use instead of rejected use (CVE-2025-4575) ============================================================================= Severity: Low Issue summary: Use of -addreject option with the openssl x509 application adds a trusted use instead of a rejected use for a certificate. Impact summary: If a user intends to make a trusted certificate rejected for a particular use it will be instead marked as trusted for that use. A copy & paste error during minor refactoring of the code introduced this issue in the OpenSSL 3.5 version. If, for example, a trusted CA certificate should be trusted only for the purpose of authenticating TLS servers but not for CMS signature verification and the CMS signature verification is intended to be marked as rejected with the -addreject option, the resulting CA certificate will be trusted for CMS signature verification purpose instead. Only users which use the trusted certificate format who use the openssl x509 command line application to add rejected uses are affected by this issue. The issues affecting only the command line application are considered to be Low severity. The FIPS modules in 3.5, 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1, 3.0, 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 are also not affected by this issue. OpenSSL 3.5 is vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.1 once it is released. Due to the low severity of this issue we are not issuing new releases of OpenSSL at this time. The fix will be included in the next release of 3.5 branch, once it becomes available. The fix is also available in commit e96d2244 (for 3.5) in the OpenSSL git repository. This issue was reported on 2nd May 2025 by Alexandr Sosedkin (Red Hat). The fix was developed by Tomáš Mráz. General Advisory Notes ====================== URL for this Security Advisory: https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20250522.txt Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional details over time. For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see: https://openssl-library.org/policies/general/security-policy/